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POINT I
POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT IS ADMISSIBLE
TO SHOW NEGLIGENCE
Evidence of post-accident flight is relevant to
show negligence by creating an inference of consciousness of
responsibility,
recklessness.

an

of

improper

lookout, or

Appellant's brief, Point I, p.4.

create six special
post-accident

inference

(and arbitrary) categories

flight must

fall before

of

Trapp would
into which

it is admissible.

These special categories are not found in the Utah Rules of
Evidence, nor are they stated in the cases themselves.
For example, post-accident flight was admitted in
Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co., 255 P.2d 802, 807
(Cal. 1953) because it is "evidence of a consciousness of
responsibility for an accident," not because there were no
other eyewitnesses.
231 A.2d 558, 561

It was admitted in Jones v. Strilecki,
(N.J. 1967) to create "an inference of

consciousness

of

lack of care

and of

liability

for the

occurrence."

No mention was made of a special

rule of

admissibility to further the purpose of a statutory fund
which was the defendant.

The other cases cited by Fisher

likewise do not artificially limit their holdings to the six
special categories asserted by Trapp.
Two of the four cases cited by Trapp to exclude
evidence of a hit-and-run are clearly distinguishable.
Barnes v.

Gaines, 668 P.2d

1175

(Okla. Ct. App.

In

1983),

flight

from

the accident

scene was

done

by means

of a

separate crime, i.e. stealing the investigating officer's
police car.

Trapp's subsequent flight did not involve such

outrageous behavior.

And, in Springer v. Adams, 140 S.E.

390 (Ga. App. 1927) , the failure to stop after an accident
was pleaded as an act of negligence causing the accident.
Because it clearly did not cause the accident, a demurrer to
the allegation was properly sustained.
In

sum,

evidence

relevant and probative.
the jury.

of

Trapp's

hit-and-run

was

It should have been presented to

Without the evidence, Trapp's testimony stands

basically unimpeached; with it, a jury verdict for Fisher is
probable.
POINT II
THE PROBATIVE VALUE IS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
OUTWEIGHED BY UNFAIR PREJUDICE
The trial court has discretion to weigh relevant
evidence

against

under Rule 403.

unfair

prejudice,

and

exclude

evidence

In this case, however, Trapp has simply

failed to identify what unfair prejudice or impermissible
inference

the

evidence may

create.

The

seventeen

cases

cited by Fisher in favor of admitting hit-and-run evidence
do not mention such unfair prejudice, nor do several other
recently uncovered cases.

See Olofson v. Kilgallon, 291

N.E.2d 600 (Mass. 1973)? Peterson v. Henning, 452 N.E.2d 135
(111. App. 1983) .
Of the four cases cited by Trapp in opposition,
only

Barnes

v.

Gaines,

supra,

weighed

probative

value

against unfair prejudice, in that case the prejudice arising
2

from the defendant's theft of the investigating officer's
police

car.

Springer

v.

Adams,

supra, was

decided

on

pleading grounds, while Freeman v, Anderson, 651 S.W.2d 450
(Ark, 1983) and Clark v. Mask, 98 S.2d 467 (Miss. 1957) were
apparently decided on relevancy grounds.
Utah
contrary.

authority

cited

by

Trapp

is

not

to

the

In Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) the

prejudicial evidence was not relevant to causation or any
other issue in the case.
P. 2d

489

defects.

(Utah, 1985)

And in Pearce v. Wistisen, 701

the prejudicial

evidence

had

two

First, it was remote from the accident, both in

time and in place.

Second, the evidence revealed to the

jury that plaintiff's son had violated religious standards
held by plaintiff, and most-likely by the jury as well.

In

contrast, Trappfs post-accident flight was immediate, both
in time and place.

Second, it does not introduce an extra-

neous issue, such as religion, which might unfairly influence a jury.
Before the trial court can use its discretion to
weigh relevance against prejudice, the unfair prejudice must
be identified.

The trial court's remark that hit-and-run

evidence would "inflame the jury" merely states a conclusion.

(Record at 272-273).

Because there

is no unfair

prejudice to Trapp from hit-and-run evidence, Trapp cannot
take refuge in the trial court's Rule 403 discretion.

3

POINT III
FISHER LAID AN ADEQUATE FOUNDATION
FOR SHUPE'S TESTIMONY
An

expert,

like

Shupef

must

have

sufficient

knowledge of the essential facts of a case to render an
intelligent opinion.
(Utah

1979) .

Shupe

Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328
gained

the

necessary

knowledge

by

visiting the accident site, measuring it, reading deposition
testimony, reviewing the police report and conducting tests.
(Record at 321-323, 326, 331, 339-41).

An adequate founda-

tion was thereby laid for his opinion as to the cause of the
accident.

Edwards v. Didericksen, supra.
Shupe's opinion (excluded by the court) as to the

cause of the accident was inattentiveness by Trapp. (R. at
334.)

Trapp claims that Fisher needed to place in evidence

Trappfs position when he
(Respondent's

first should have

Brief, p.24.)

Assuming

such

seen Fisher.
an

artificial

foundation is required, Fisher did place that point into
evidence.

Shupe testified that Trapp was about 14 6 feet

from the point of impact when Fisher began to cross the
street.

(R. at 338-339.)

Shupe assumed that point to be

the place where Trapp first should have seen Fisher.
Trapp objected to Shupefs conclusion that he was
inattentive

on

the

ground

Shupe

did

not

consider

the

lighting or passing cars which may have blocked his view.
(R. at 332.)

The jury was not required to believe Trapp's

claim that it was too dark to see Fisher, and that passing
cars may have blocked his vision.
required

Likewise, Shupe was not
to

4

assume the truth of Trapp's claims either, while arriving at
his

opinion.

Shupe's

testimony

that

Trapp's

inattention

caused the accident was therefore improperly excluded.
subsequent

admission

of

Shupe's

weakened the testimony by placing

testimony

on

The

rebuttal

it in an unfair light.

Appellant's Brief, Point VII, p.14.

CONCLUSION
Evidence that Trapp was a hit-and-run driver is
relevant to show a consciousness of guilt, improper lookout,
recklessness

and

to

impeach

his

testimony.

While

that

evidence may "inflame" the jury to draw such permissible
inferences, it is.not unfairly prejudicial to Trapp.
the

trial

court

did

not

have

the

discretion

to

Thus,
exclude

post-accident flight under Rule 403.
Furthermore, Fisher's expert, Shupe, was wrongfully prevented from telling the jury that Trapp's inattentiveness caused the accident.
position

when

Fisher

Shupe's calculations of Trapp's

began

to

cross

the

street

grounded his opinion on the facts of the case.

firmly

These two

errors raise a reasonable likelihood that Fisher would have
received a more favorable result had there been no error.
This case should be remanded for a new trial.
DATED this 22

day of ^s^^Ives

1986.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Appellant
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